Abstract: Drawingo ne mpirical data from the Scandinavian project Engaging with Conflicts in Mediatized Religious Environments (CoMRel), this chapter analyses the findingsf rom case-studies in: classrooms,o nline communities,p ublic service media (PSM)p roduction rooms,l ocal news outlets, and interreligious dialogue initiatives. Gender and ethno-religious diversity receive particulara nalyticala ttention. We discuss the multiple ways in which various social actors in Scandinavia engagew ith mediatized conflicts about religion, and the ways in which dominantm edia framesa re replicated, contested, and nuanced. Am ain finding is that mediatizedconflicts about religion are symptomaticallyentangled in ad ichotomyb etween good or bad religion, and thats ocial actors in the diverse settingsa re often cast in the role of 'the ideal citizen' or 'the religious other'.D espite attemptsa tg oingb eyond enmeshedd iscourses of immigration and othering,a nd ag eneral awarenesso ft he dominant media frame 'Islam as ab ad religion',the frame proves difficult to overcome.
Mediatized Conflicts
In Contested Religion: TheM edia Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia, we examine how media condition public engagement with contested issues about religion in av ariety of social settingsi nS candinavia. Our case studies in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are founded on conceptuallyd rivenc omparisons. The strength of our research is that we approach the case studies with a rangeofepistemological backgrounds and methodological tools and across avariety of social settings, yetare interested in overlappingquestions and conceptualizationso fm edia, religion, and conflict.O ur methods include aq uantitative survey,p articipant observation, qualitative interviews,f ocus group interviews, analysis of media content,m ulti-sited fieldworks, and an online ethnography.
Our unique and rich data are collected from various media-saturatede nvironments in Scandinavia, such as classrooms,o nline communities,p ublic service media (PSM) production rooms,l ocal news outlets, and interreligious dialogue initiatives. Drawing on the entire bodyo fc ase studies, in this chapter we ask the following:I nwhat wayand to what extent are media implicated in conflicts about religion in Scandinavia? This chapter movesacross the different case studies in the book.W ed iscuss and analyse the findings of the previous chapters, and highlight the commonalities and crosscurrents that we find across the empirical cases. We delimito ur discussion to the ways in which the intersection of gender,diversity,and media framesofreligion playout across the case studies described in previous chapters. In particular, this chapter reflects on how gender dimensions and the management of diversitya re implicated in mediatizedc onflicts in the various studies. The chapter alsoreflects upon the theories of mediatization of religion and the mediatizedconflicts outlinedinthe first part of the book (see Chapters 3a nd 4). The further development and revision of the mediatization theory basedonour case studies will nonetheless be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 17.
By managemento fd iversity, we refert ot he social practices of addressing, supportinga nd framing ethnic and/or religious minorities. We delimito ur discussion of the management of diversityt ot he empirical findingsf rom our cases . The interrelation between media, culture, social life, and politics, is one of mutual influencea nd thus important to analyze (Hepp, Hjarvarda nd Lundby 2015; E skjaer,H jarvarda nd Mortensen 2015) . Put simply, media, shape culture, social life and politics -and vice versa -as media brings about dual functions, reflectingand shaping issuesoccurringwithin these three domains. Af undamental theoretical premise across the case studies is that frames direct our perception, thought, and action during social and media events (Goffman 1986 ,1 0 -11) for which reason control and distribution of frames is ap rime concern in the operation and analysis of management.What emergesisahighlymobile mannerofdirectingcollective conduct,which traverses and correlates social spaces with frame spaces (Jacobsen 2016,30) . Framing processes involveprocesses of selection and salience and tend to promote problem definitions, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation for the people and incidents described (Entman 1993, 52, See Chapters 11, 15) . In otherwords, media frames, framing and frameworks illustrate how communicative 'texts' exercise power (ibid.) and, thus, framing processes inadvertentlybring about implicit forms of governance that maybeanalyticallyexcavated.
Frames are more salient when certain aspectsofthe frame resonatewith an individual'scognitive schema or themesalreadyestablished in public discourse, such as 'Islam =b ad religion'.A ccordingt oE ttema (2005, 133) , the success of a frame relies on the ability of af rame to 'strike ar esponsive chord' and 'draw upon ac ulturalr epertoireo ft hemes and stories'.S till, in our case studies, we also find that dominant frames do not go uncontested in the various social settingswes tudy, although some counter-framesa re lesss uccessfullycrafted than others (see Chapters 8a nd 11), or receive less consideration than the dominant frames (see Chapter 6). At times, the salience and appeal of certain frames lead to adisproportionatea mount of attention to an ews story such as in the case of 'the Swedish handshake' (seeC hapter 13).
In this chapter,wee xplore the interplayb etween media, religion, and conflict across arangeofsocial settings, and take into consideration that media audiences are not simply uncritical recipients of media frames. Audiencese ngage with and contest media stories and events, but are nonetheless affected by dominant media frames. We have looked into the multiple ways in which social actors in Scandinavia engagewith conflict and dominant media frames -ways that include contesting media frames, as well as replicating and nuancing them.¹ In the World Values Survey,S candinavia counts as the most secular corner of the world. The levels of personal religious practice and religious self-identification are low.However,the majority of the population in all three countries are members of the national Lutheran Church. Form ost members, the affiliation to the church is more of aculturalbelongingthan matterofpersonal belief (see Chapters 2, 4, 6, and 10; M arzouki et al. 2016) . While,there is abroad historicalProtestant Christian tradition in Scandinavia (see in particularC hapters 1a nd 2), today, this region comprises ag reater diversity of religious and secular worldviews. While therea re commendable attempts at ensuring ab roader and unbiased representation of religious and ethnic minorities in Scandinavian media, minorities are often under-represented or stereotypicallyp ortrayedi n the media at large (Axner 2016,2 015; J ørndrup 2017; F igenschou and Beyer 2014) . The chapters in this book on 'contesting religion' focuses preciselyoncontroversies and mediatized conflicts about religion that arise with diversity.
Managing Diversity
Religious and ethnic diversity can be managed in av ariety of ways. Interestingly,all the empirical findingsfrom our case studies and survey demonstrate that in aS candinavian context,I slam is repeatedlyp itted against either  On framing,s ee Chapter3and Chapter7 .
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Christianityorsecularism -renderingotherbelief systems close to irrelevant.As previous chapters have elucidated, contestations of religion are enmeshedindiscourses about immigration and othering,a nd majority and minority population relations (see Chapters 6 -15). Here, we reflect on how religious diversity is managed in avariety of Scandinavian contexts, based on the empirical findingspresented in the previous chapters.While our analysis across the Scandinavia case studies focuses primarily on how issues of framing,g ender,a nd diversity are managed with regards to primarilyIslam and Christianity,weare in no waysuggesting that there are no otheri mportant belief systems or minorityr eligions in the region. Nor is our purpose to make an ormative claim about what ethno-religious diversityessentiallyentails. Instead, we reflect on the multitude of empirical ways (See Chapters 1-15) in which mediatized contestations of religion play out in present-day Scandinavia. The omnipresenceof'dominant negative media frames' is palpable in our study. Such frames depict Islam as an authoritarian, oppressive,and violent religion, which clashes with so-called 'Scandinavian values'.D ominant frames are remediated in av ariety of Scandinavian social settings( seeC hapters 6 -15), and shape the ways in which diversity is managed in everydays ocial interactions.
Astrikingsimilarityacross manyofthe case studies is the manner in which dealing with the dominant media frames about Islam head-on is considered a necessary -and perhaps somewhat courageous -act of facing 'the elephant in the room'. 'Conflict and Islam, that'sthe elephant in the room,' says asecondary school teacher (Chapter 15), when describing how she feels obliged to talk about the negative media frames about Islam.Y et,b yr epeatedlyr eferringt o news coveragew ith the purpose of countering dominant frames about Islam, teachers mayu nintentionallys ervet or einforce and confirm the association of Islam with controversy.Wea rgue that despite ag eneral awarenesso fd ominant media frames, they nonetheless seem difficult to overcome. Indeed, the dominant images of Muslims and Islam are continuouslyr eproduced, remediated, or renegotiated in all of the Scandinavian settingsw eh aves tudied.
This dilemmai sp artiallya ddressed by some of the social actors we study, for instance by the teachers and PSM producers in Chapters 7, 13,1 4, and 15, which suggests that teachers and PSM producers believet hey cannot ignore the dominant negative frames, yeta tt he same time they struggle with how to talk about their content in am anner that neither offends religious minorities, nor contributes to giving such frames more momentum. Coupled with this selfawareness is the fear of cementing the idea thatIslam is a 'bad religion'.Essentially, the teachers,PSM producers,social media users, and participants in interreligious dialogues all face the same predicament.O nt he one hand, they feel compelled to interact with the dominantf rames -without condoning them -and on the on the other hand they are acutelya ware of the fact that they may unintentionallycome to reinforce the imageofIslam as a 'bad religion' and Muslims as less than ideal citizens. Forinstance, in the interreligious dialogue meetingsorreligious education (RE) classes, by stating that Muslims are 'not just terrorists',o ne simultaneouslyr einforces the idea that manyM uslims are indeed terrorists (Lakoff 2014 ,a sd iscussed in Chapter 15;s ee alsoC hapter 11).
Across the case studies we see how social actors,eventhose who attempt to do otherwise,may getentrapped by stereotypical representations. In Chapter 11, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking's(2011, 275) term 'banal securitization' is usedasa signifier of the ways in which the securitizationo fI slam² affectst he everyday liveso fS candinavian Muslims in highlyt angible ways (see also Chapter 12). 'Banal securitization of Islam',a sd efined in Chapter 11, denotes everydayp ractices in which people and themes are categorized in stereotypical terms in response to macro-events with local ramifications. Thus, the banal securitization of Islam applies to the ways in which Muslims are perceivedb yscores of others in light of global media events. Teachers (Chapters 13 -15),PSM producers (Chapters 7a nd 8), as well as social media users (Chapters 6a nd 9), irrespective of their own personal faith or inclination towards secularism or atheism, all contribute to the 'banal securitization' of religion.
Still, PSM producers,school teachers,participantsininterreligious dialogue programmes -are all acutelya ware of the risks of reinforcing negative stereotypes about Muslims and go to great painst ot ry to fashion counter-narratives about Islam. Members of the DanishPSM production team in Chapter 7explicitly state that they feelc ornered into ac hoice between the entrenched positions of being either an Islam bashero ra nI slam apologist,n either of which appeals to them. In their efforts to stayc lear of both,t he Danish PSM producers downplaythe religious identity of their participants, which maywell resultinadepiction thatt ranscends 'the religious other' ascribed representation ( Nadim 2017) . While, this strategy provides more nuanced representation of religious and ethnic minorities, it nonetheless demonstratesh ow Danish PSM producers are locked into ad ialectic relationship with the dominant media frames that posit Islam as a 'bad religion'.P SM producers mayi nadvertentlye nd up reinforcing the negative stereotypes about Muslims as well as the dominantm edia frames that posit Islam as a 'bad religion',F or instance, Swedish PSM producers aim to present an alternativetothe dominant negative media discourses by providing  Jocelyne Cesari (2013) and others have coined the term 'securitization of Islam' for the rhetorical tropes,partlyinduced by the media, that depict Muslims in Western countries constitute as a threat to national security. ap latform for the equal representation of Christianity and Islam (Chapter 8). Nonetheless,t hey end up reinforcing dominantf rames about Islam as ap roblematic religion to be associated with violence and extremism. Despitet he producers' initial intent to provide amore nuanced representation of Islam,the programme Människor och tro (People and belief), ends up portraying Christianity as a 'good religion',which in turn is contrasted to Islam.³ Intriguingly, the lack of viable positions and the sense of entrapment is evident in manyofthe case studies. Even in the case of the Yestowearing the cross whenever and wherever Ic hoose (YWC) Facebook group, in which participants appear to have awider spectrum of ideological positions, we find that ultimately one must choose being either for or against Islam -but also -for or against Christianitya nd religion in general, respectively (see Chapter 6; Abdel-Fadil 2017). When taking the case studies together, it seems that completelye scaping the 'good vs. bad religion' dichotomyi sc lose to impossible. Downplaying religion altogethermay well be an attempt at overcoming this good vs. bad religion dialectic (see Chapter 7), but might not necessarilyr esolve all tensions.
Moulding the Ideal Citizen
The good vs. bad religion frames are circumvented by Danish PSM producers' attempt to portray minority citizens in adifferent light (Chapter 7). Yet, in our view, renderingreligion invisible, plays into the moulding of an ideal minoritycitizen, particularlyw hen the alternative is 'bad religion'.Asimilar dynamic is in play when the inclusion of more diverse voices is attempted in the various arenas (see Chapters 5 -15).R eligious and ethnicm inorities experience greater access to the media, when cast as 'the ethnic/religious other' (Nadim 2017) . As exemplified in the PSM case from Sweden minority voices have unequal access (see Chapters 8). More importantly, ar ather narrow space for the idealizedc itizen with aminorityreligious background is carved out (Schinkel 2008; van Es 2016) .
Meeting the ideal requires aparticular vernacular and aspecific vocabulary and conduct.Inthis sense,diversity is encouraged but onlyinspecific and highly governedways. Intriguingly,i tseems that the projection of the ideal religious minoritycitizen shapes interactions in several of the settings, not least in the interreligious dialogues, classrooms,a nd everydayi nteractions botho n-and off- See also Mahmood Mamdani'sfamous article 'Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: APolitical Perspective on Culture and Terrorism' (2002) .H ere, Mamdanid econstructs cultural explanationsofpolitical results, such as the events of September 11, and (re)situates the terrorist events in ah istorical and political context.
line (See Chapters 6, 8, (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) . Still, thereappears to be an implication that all citizens ought to hold similar views. We would arguethat by sidestepping discussing religion (Chapter 7), DanishP SM producers showcase articulate, idealized, minority citizens, whose real or imagined religiosity,i sd ownplayedi na n attempt to overcome representations as the 'religious other' (Nadim 2017) . Still, the idealized Scandinavian citizenc an take the shape of am ore explicitly religious persona, albeit in governedw ays. In effect,t he idealizedc itizen must choose between 'good religion' or 'no religion',inorder to avoid being associated with 'bad religion'.D espite theira ttempts at diversifying the participants and speakers in their shows, the Scandinavian PSM programmes still provide uneven and unequal access to religious minorities (seeC hapter 8), and those who participate in public debates and interreligious forums are stylizedt of it am ould of an ideal citizen (seeC hapters 7, 8, 11) who is knowledgeable, peaceful, articulate, and compassionate.
In Chapter 11,Gullestad'sconcept of 'prototypes' is referred to and in Chapter 4, the authorsw rite about 'emblematic' renderingso fr eligion. What we see across manyo ft he case studies is what can be called 'emblematic prototypes', renderings that come to reproducet he symbolic, emblematicf acets of religion while simultaneouslyr eplicatingp rototypes -or what Amin Maalouf( 2012)r efers to as 'essentialized identities'.F or instance, aw oman who wears the hijab is reduced to 'Muslim' or the piece of cloth she wears on her head, rendering her individuality and other facets of her identity entirelyi rrelevant.Thus, Scandinavian Muslims do not seem to be able to escape the ways in which mediatized frames of 'Islam' seep into their everydaylives. Yet, 'emblematic prototypes' also shape the everydayi nteractions of the conservative Christians and atheists in YWCw heret herei sastrong symbolic attribution to either faith or non-faith.
Across the various cases, we find the construction of the ideal Scandinavian citizen,particularlyasamould for the Muslim but alsofor other citizenstoconform to (Liebmann 2017) . Interreligious forums offer aprime spacefor displaying the self as the peaceful, egalitarian, rational, civilized, tolerant,e mpatheticand thus idealized -citizen. Although this might be most evident in terms of moulding the ideal Muslim participant,i ta lso goes for the other citizens (see Chapter 11). When consideringt he case studies togetherw ec an detect traces of how all citizens are governed in aw ay that is aimeda tt ransformingt hem into more idealizedv ersions of themselvesa nd their respective citizenships whether they identify as atheists, Christians, secularists, Muslims, etc. This way, we detect the ways in which media condition processes of what in a post-Foucauldiang overnance sense mayb er eferred to as 'citizen formation' (Rose [1999] 2010) in relation to religion.
In Chapter 8, we see how,s omewhat surprisingly,the Swedish police academystudent Donna Eljammal, posing in uniform and ahijab, was met with mostly positive feedback in the online comments to the posting of her image. Her occupational commitment to Sweden is commemorated and Donna Eljammali s framed as an ational symbol of how ay oung Muslim woman ideallys hould take part in, and contributet o, Swedish society.Thus, the mediated DonnaE ljammal in this rendition, comest or epresent the civic ideal for aM uslim woman in Sweden.
The NorwegianPSM show Faten tar valget (Faten makes her choice)follows the 22-year-old (non-fictional) Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini, aMuslim hijabi woman while she makes up her mind about which political party to vote for in the Norwegian parliamentary elections of 2017.While Swedish Donna Eljammalwas for the most part hailed, Norwegian Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini receivedmanyhateful comments about both her and the hijab, includingd eath threats.⁴ Considering this volume'sa im of examining how various media condition public engagement with contested issues about religion, it is worth reflecting on whyt wo seemingly similar incidents in Norwaya nd Sweden mayhaves purred such different responses. Faten Makes Her Choice evidentlystirs up negative emotionsa mong what Michailidou and Trenz (2015) call 'enraged fans'.A nd in this context,insisting on the removal of ayoungMuslim woman'shijab to prove that she is wearingitofher own freewill is considered alegitimate demand. The ironyo fi ntimidating and forcingayoung woman to remove ah ijab in order to demonstrate thath er attire is voluntary is considerable. However,what complicates the picture somewhat is that in bothNorway and Sweden anumber of the positive public reactions to Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini and Donna Eljammal, respectively,e mphasized how it was the individual and her civice ngagement, not her hijab or her religion, that came to the foreground. It would seem, then, that mediation of civice ngagement and participation in the democracy as an ideal citizen holds the potential to overshadow the at times near obsessive focus on the hijab in other contexts. Thus, under particular circumstances, the individualityo famedia playerm ay trumph er 'ascribed representation' of ar eligious or ethnic group or her being cast as an 'ethnic other' as has been found to be the case in recent studies (Nadim2 017, Midtbøen 2016) .
To what extent can the different responses in Sweden and Norwaybeattributed to differences in the debate climate, timing,m edium, or stratified audien- FatenA l-Mahdi Hussaini since repeatedlyaddressed the vile comments in public videos and expressed her claim to both Norwegianess and the hijab -but also exposed her vulnerability and sadness about this turn of events.
ces?Contextual factors such as the timing of the Norwegian show justbefore the parliamentary elections in September 2017 mayh avea mplified the conflict around FatenA l-Mahdi Hussaini, while the predominantlym iddle-aged, welleducated audience of People and Belief, on which DonnaE ljammala ppeared, mayh aves ubdued the level of conflict in Sweden. Yet, theres eems to be more at play. In retrospect,t he massive negative response to Faten Makes Her Choice was perhaps more about the context of the 'cross case' and the emblematic Christianityofi dentity it inspired than the hijab itself. As described more in detail in Chapter 6, the cross casew as ac ontroversy in 2013 over the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation's( NRK) decision to bar one of its news anchors from wearingh er cross pendant while hostinga nN RK evening news programme.
The fact that in 2017 NRK receivedmoret han 5,000 complaints about Faten Makes Her Choice before the show had even been aired raises suspicions that this response was coordinated. The complainers accused NRK of ad ouble standard: NRK was allowing one form of religious attire,the hijab,b ut not another, the cross,o nt heir TV programmes. In otherw ords, the engaged, and enraged, publics werei nf act primarily critiquing the neutrality policy in the NRK cross case (seeC hapter 6). By extension, FatenA l-Mahdi Hussaini and her hijab are understood as at hreat to the cross and its visible presence. Forc onservative Christians and others who see Christianitymostlyasaform of belonging, rather than believing,t he NRK cross case comes to symbolize the deterioration of 'Christian values' on PSM while FatenA l-Mahdi Hussaini gets to flaunt her hijab. The conflation of the principle of neutrality for news bulletins with the less strict policy for hostsofall other types of programming has been an integral part of the cross controversy from the very start,ashas the erroneous perception that the cross is banned but the hijab is not in PSM programming.R egardless, both Donna Eljammal and FatenA l-Mahdi Hussaini are fashioned into prototypes of 'Muslim women' imaginaries who either conform to 'the ideal citizen' or its antithesis.
More importantlyfor our purposes, the brief comparison between Donna Eljammal and FatenAl-Mahdi Hussaini'sexperiences aptlydemonstrate how meditatizedc onflicts about religion can be amplified, transformed, and multiplied into new conflicts basedo nt he perseverance of particulars ocial actors.M oreover,itdemonstrates how one side of adebate maysucceed in getting ad isproportionate amount of attention on one particular aspect.
In some of the case studies we seeaco-dependantd ialectic between Islam depicted as a 'bad religion' and Christianity portrayedasa'good religion'.But we also see thatw ithin ar eligion, certain renderings are deemed more desirable than others, often in accordancew ith or as an extension of ac onceptualization of an ideal citizen. Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini'si deal citizenship was even con-doned by the prime ministero fN orwayw ho, not insignificantly, chose to highlight how Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini has contributed actively to anti-radicalization programmes.⁵ The sense that religion comes to be more about belongingt hanb elieving cuts across several of the case studies.Wer epeatedlys ee how media condition both the culturalization and securitizationo fr eligion (see Chapter 4), most notablyw ith regards to Islam (see Chapters 8, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] and Christianity (see Chapters 6a nd 10). Within this framework, the hijab becomes emblematically linked to Islam,a nd the cross becomes emblematicallya ssociated with Christianity and nationhood and we sees everal examples of how Islam is cast as a 'bad religion' and Christianityi sc ast as its opposite, a 'good religion'.H owever, in some instances,weo bservet hatC hristianity is being contested from within (see Chapters 6a nd 10) wheret ensions between 'golden rule Christianity' and Christianitya si dentity clash. Yet, in some cases it is religion per se thati s cast as the villain (see Chapter 6). This drawsaweb of components that the ideal citizen is expected to adhere to and promote.
'The Muslim Woman'
Despite beingatrope across manyofthe book'schapters, none of the chapters is solelyd evoted to what has become the most prominent symbol of culturala nd religious encounters, and subsequent societal tensions,inpresent-day Scandinavia: 'the Muslim woman'.Muslim women have duringthe last 20 years repeatedly been placed at the centreofpublic debates in Europe and would seem an obvious point of departure in abook thatexplores the media dynamics of cultural conflicts in Scandinavia. The fact thatthe contributions in Contested Religion do not dwell on this matter does not mean thatgender dimensions are not an interrelated part of the various case studies.
The manyp ublic debates related to the female Muslim body, clothing,a nd lifestyle testify to the status of the notionofwhat is taken to be ahighlyreligious and oppressed -primarilyMuslim -woman symbolizingwhat manyperceive as the restraining effect of religion. Tied in with this widespread imaginary is the dominant media frame (seeChapter 3). Mass media tend to frame Islam as adistinct threat to women'srights and genderequality, thus giving waytonotions of Muslim women as emblematic of religiously motivated violence. However,anal- Espen Alnes and Hanna HuglenR evheim, "Solberg: -Faten fortener ikkje hetsen," NRK, 23 Aug2 017. https://www.nrk.no/kultur/solberg_-_-faten-fortener-ikkje-hetsen-1.13655103 ternative media frame is graduallye merging in part as ar esponse to the dominant media frame and widespread stigmatization of youngM uslims as threats to national security in Western societies. Especiallypublic service media, as analysed in Chapters 7a nd 8, employ alternative frames comprised of three strands: first,aframe consistingo fy oung Muslim women as symbols of tolerance; second, ah uman-interest frame in which personalization, stories, ideal cases, and emotionsa re deployed in the dramaturgy of the media; and third, representations of 'ordinary Muslims' with an inherent focus on Islam as (everyday) livedc ulture.
The focus on ordinary Muslims is atendencywhich has its equivalent in the focus on livedr eligion as ad istinct field of studyw ithin academia, ar esearch strand thath as developed over the last three decades and affords attention to everydayreligion as it is lived, and practised, by millions of people (see Dessing et al. 2013; M cGuire 2008) .⁶ But how does this alternative and budding media frame impact the wayg ender and religion are approached in public service media?A ss een in Chapter 7, in relation to Islam,g ender may, on one hand, work as at riggert heme in relation to Islam that can easilya ctivatet ensions and conflicts. On the other hand, the chapter also demonstrates how conscious planning of debates -and drawing on available professional resources in public service media -maya llow gender issues such as sexuality to be addressed in relation to religion in ways that createi ntense debates but at the samet ime allow new voices and marginalized arguments to be heard -at least in comparison with traditional news agendas on Islam. One aspect of this strategy is to downplaythe explicit religious dimensions of gender issues and instead discuss them as generational and culturali ssues.
The much-contested trope of 'the Muslim woman',p articularlyw hen adorned with the hijab, is, as mentioned earlier,d epicted as posingathreat to the idealizedcitizen. The hijab becomes ahighlyvisible and emblematic symbol of Islam,and is intrinsicallytied to the negative mediatizedframing of Islam as a sourceofconflict and gender-based oppression, leadingtoconstruingawoman's active choice to wear ah ijab as 'false consciousness' and in consequence 'the oppressed Muslim woman' for whom concern is expressed, is simultaneously stripped of agency by her alleged saviours (Abdel-Fadil 2006; Abu-Lughod 2013) .
The tensions surrounding the hijab surface in many of the case studies. For instance, in Chapter 12 the hijab is what makes the femaleconverts 'visiblyMus- Studies on livedreligion tend to focus on laity,instead of clergy or elites; on practices rather than beliefs;o np ractices outside religious institutions rather than inside; and on individual agencya nd autonomyr ather than on collectivities or traditions (Ammerman 2016).
lim' and their identity contentious in public space. This is in stark contrasttothe Muslim male converts who are not as 'visibly' Muslim. Regardlesso fe thnicity, women who wear the hijab are not onlydetectable in public space, but in effect 'hypervisible',t ou se Gullestad's( 2006) terminology. Hypervisibility impliesa distinguishability that is inescapable and fraught with tensions, often coupled with avoice that is rendered irrelevant or not listened to,i.e.silencing diversity. As discussed in Chapter 12,Muslim women who successfullyw ield the imageof ah ijabi fashionista somehow evade some of the negative projections on the hijab, and inch closer to the ideal citizen; apparently( Muslim) women cannot be all that oppressed if they wear fashionable clothes and an eye-catchingl ipstick colour,t his logic seems to suggest.
Gendered Interactions
Mediatization impliesl ong-term transformationso fs ocial and culturalp atterns in media-saturated societies and thus shapes social interactions. However,mediatization does not determine the outcome of the social and media dynamics (see Chapter 3). The ways in which religion sometimes allows for alternative ways of imagininggenderdoes not necessarilyoverthrow the mediatization thesis but it does underline the complexity of the relationship between religion and media and questions who exactlys ets the agenda for how we understand religion and gender ( Lövheim 2013a; S jö 2016,137) .
Chapters 11 and 12 share afocus on the responses by Scandinavian Muslims to the predominantlyn egative media frames and thus of Muslims' negotiations of belonging in am ediatizeds ociety.H ence, these two case studies inhabit representational challenges symptomatic to qualitative studies of this kind. When mobilizing interlocutors -informants -for aq ualitative,h umanistic, or social scientifics tudyt hrough institutions, organizations,a nd networks,r esearchers often wind up with predominantlymale participants who thus come to represent various religious affiliations and organizations in ag eneric sense but with a tacit,g endered bias (Rayaprol 2016) . Fori nstance, the Swedish PSM producers inadvertentlyr einforce traditionalforms of religious authority,byi nviting chairpersons, imams, and professors,who, in most cases, were male (seeC hapter 8). The over-representationofmen when attemptingtoupminority media representation appears to be part of ag eneral tendency in Scandinavia (Jørndrup 2017 ). Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are several differences between the ways in which men and women relatet or eligion in general, and with regards to media practices.These differences follow ap attern established in previous studies: female respondents seem to be more supportive of the statement that all religions should be respected, while male respondents in general seem more critical of expressions of religion in public, especiallyIslam,and support critical coverageof Islam and Judaism in the media more thanwomen do. Moreover,gender has the strongest significance in the survey analysis when it comes to respondents' willingness to discuss news on religious extremismwith others; men are more likely to do so thanwomen (see Chapter 2).M en are also morei nclined to discuss religion and in particular religious extremism online. Within these topics, genderis more significant than for example religious self-identification and political position. Besides reflectingpersistent genderroles and positions in the Scandinavian context,these genderdifferences remind us of how research must always be attentive to the wayi nw hich divergences between men and women (and other genders),respectively,tie in with how different genders come to grasp, approach, and interpret religion differently.
Anumber of studies suggest that thereisagendereddimension to the ways in which men and women engagew ith social media and online debates about sensitivet opics like religion and politics (see Chapter 2, 6, 11; L övheim 2013a , 2013b .Notably,women appear to be less active in online debates and our survey in Scandinavia supports this understanding in that more men state that they frequentlyd iscuss religion online. However,t he online ethnographyo ft he Facebook page Yest ow earing the cross whenever and wherever Ic hoose (YWC) (see Chapter 6) points to the importance of the triangulation of methods. In YWC we find ah andful of dedicated women with particularlyh ighl evels of activity that are unparalleled by male participants. This suggests that some women mayi nM iller et al.'s( 2016,1 78)t erminologyb eb oth 'doing politics' more, and participatingi nm ore active ways than some of the men that statisticallys peaking are very active online. The frequencyw ith which women and men reportt o participate in online debates reveals little about the level of engagement or the emotional labour involved. Future studies must strive to nuance our understandingsofgendered online involvement in mediatized conflicts with all its invisibilities and complexities.
Correspondently, another gender issue of concern to these, and other, chapters is thato fg endereda gency. Since the 1980s, af ocus on women as religious actors has graduallyoccurred in response to the predominant view thatreligious women are passive victims of religious ideologies.Inboth Chapters 11 and 12,the issues of belonging -and citizenship -can be connected to gender at the intersection of religion and nationality (Sauer 2016,1 08) . Birgit Sauer argues that a new concept of citizenship is constructed, negotiated and promoted in European countries through the hijab debates (ibid.). This perspective ties in with discussions of how debates on covered women in Europe should be interpreted in the light of an underlying and dominant frame of secular European progress (Wood-head 2009) and with the post-secular turn in humanisticand social scientific research (Gemzöea nd Keinänen 2016,3 ) .
So, what did we learn?W el earned that two main aspects are pivotalw hen reflectingo ng enderi nr espect to mediatization, media framesa nd ethno-religious conflicts in the respective cases tudies. The first is the representation of gender -understood both as the relative number of participantsa ctive in mass and social media, various organizations, and local civic settings, and as the wayi nwhich genderi sp ortrayed and comes to be enacted in these arenas. The second aspect is gendered agency in relation to, and as part of, the representations in question. Especiallyw omen'sr eligious agencyoutside asimple frame of oppressor-oppressed in the field of gender and religion (Gemzöe and Keinä-nen 2016,8 ) , continues to be of significance.
In importantways, the abovementioned dominant frames and embeddeddebates form the background of what has been labelled the post-secular turn in humanistic and social scientific research (Gemzöe and Keinänen 2016,3) . This turn involves aq uestioning of earlier theories basedo nt he premise thatr eligion would gradually( continue to) lose importance as as ocial forcei nE urope and in the rest of the world. The turn impliesi nstead that new theoretical frameworks,s uch as the sub-framesm entioned aboven uancing the role of religion and gender in media (and media in gendera nd religion),a re necessary to comprehend what religion is and is comingt ob ei np resent-day societies and how religion is related to secularism. In this, the turn alsoi nvolvesr evisitingg ender dimensions in religion, and not least in Islam. This is atask for further studies on religion and the mediatization of religion.
The Dynamics of Mediatized Conflictso f Religion
Media production teamsa nd editors make choicest hat mayh avef ar-reaching ramifications of which they are unaware. Forinstance, they mayunintentionally influenceand confirm male-dominated religious hierarchies of authority or grant unequal access to social actors in their attempts to manage,d iversity.The gendered and unsteadym anagement of diversity plays into the multiple ways in which mediatized conflicts about religion are enacted, by as pectrum of social actors,inawide rangeofScandinavian online and offline mediatized social settings(see Chapters 6 -15). Across the casestudies, we find thatminorities are frequently 'ethnicified' and/or moulded into idealizedf orms of minorityc itizens (Nadim 2017,2 30) .
Tensions, controversies, and conflicts have become so integraltoboth media coverageand audience engagement that they increasingly come to represent normalcy.Manydiscussions about religion in everydaylife are centred around mediatized conflicts, as evidencedi nt he various case studies in this book. We find that various Scandinavian publics engageand interact with mediatizedconflicts about religion in ways that betray an attention economy -whereconflict at times is the glue of ag iven news story.
As triking feature across manyoft he cases studies is the importance of entertainment and media events. We see for instance how the school teachers lean heavilyonboth popularculturemedia products and over-focus on controversies and media events linked to religion, in particular with regardt oI slam,i nt heir attempts to reel in the students' attention (see Chapters 13 -15). Likewise, the choices PSM producers make playi nto the media dynamics of entertainment and conflict and mayi nt urn attract or put off publics.W em ust not overlook the fact thatd ealing full-on with controversiesc an in itself be viewed as a form of entertainment as evidencedinthe classrooms,aswellasinPSM production rooms (seeC hapters 7a nd 8) and in the online debates we examine (see Chapter 6).
Mass media and social media co-construct and condition worldviews and social interactions, as illustrated throughout this volume (see Chapters 3 -15). Contested Religion: TheMedia Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia contributes to arefined understandingofmediatization of religion, through theoretical contributions on how mediatization is shaped through social interactions (Chapters 3, 4and 17), and empirical cases demonstrating how avariety of social actors and media users engage with mediatized conflicts about religion (Chapters 5 -15). In this chapter,wehaveprovided an analysis of the interplaybetween media framingsand the multitude of ways in which conflicts are enacted and religion is contested basedo narangeo fS candinavian cases tudies. We contend that our empirically-grounded analysis,o ft he gendered and unsteadym anagement of diversity,i nm ediatizedc onflicts about religion, provides ap latform from which to challengea nd further develop the conceptualizations of mediatization of religion (seeChapter 17). Our analysis will, togetherwith the entire volume, Contested Religion: TheMedia Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia, hopefullyinspire further in-depth studies on the complexity of contested religion in mediatized societies.
